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 1 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE PUBLIC LAW 
ANALOGY: THE FALLACIES OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
METHOD 
ABSTRACT 
 Over the past ten years, commentators have drawn an analogy between the international 
investment regime and domestic public law in order to fill gaps, resolve ambiguities, and 
understand the nature of the investment regime. One way in which domestic public law may be 
relevant is if it reflects a general principle of law that is applicable by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The practice of international investment tribunals 
demonstrates, however, that tribunals do not use domestic law according to the ‘general principles 
method’. Instead, investment tribunals’ use of comparative law raises various normative and 
methodological issues that have not yet been thoroughly addressed in the literature. The article 
identifies and addresses some of those issues.   
I. COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES  
 The relative novelty of the international investment regime has led authors to draw 
analogies with a range of other systems, from international commercial arbitration1 to human rights 
law,2 in order to respond to the host of theoretical and practical challenges the regime poses.3 Of 
these analogies, perhaps the most interesting is the parallel drawn with domestic public law.4 
Advocates of the analogy argue that investment disputes are “regulatory dispute[s] arising between 
                                                 
1 See eg Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada (Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001) para. 79. See further, Charles Brower, ‘W(h)ither 
International Commercial Arbitration’, (2008) 24 Arbitration International 181; Walter Mattli, ‘Private Justice in a 
Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration’, (2001) 55 International Organization 919.   
2 See eg Mondev International Ltd v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 2002) 
paras 143-44. See further, Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2008) 136-43; Valentina 
Vadi, Analogies in International Investment Arbitration (CUP 2016) 217-19.  
3 See generally, Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of the Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System’, (2013) 107 American J Int L 45. Cf. Martins Paparinskis, ‘Analogies and Other Regimes of International 
Law’, in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge E. Vinuales (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law: 
Bringing Theory into Practice (OUP 2014).  
4 David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise (CUP 2008); 
Stephan W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010); Santiago Montt, State Liability 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart 2012); Van Harten 
(n 2). 
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the state (acting in a public capacity) and an individual who is subject to the exercise of public 
authority by the state”5 in much the same way as public and administrative law disputes relate to 
the exercise of public authority in domestic legal systems.6 They argue that this functional similarity 
means that it is beneficial to look to domestic public law to fill gaps, resolve ambiguities, or 
understand the nature of the international investment regime.7  
 One of the ways to operationalise the public law analogy is through treaty interpretation.8 
Arbitrators could draw on comparative surveys of domestic public and administrative law in order 
to guide the interpretation of the vague provisions and broad standards that are invariably 
incorporated in investment treaties.9 Proponents argue that the benefits of drawing on comparative 
public law in this way are manifold: it would enable the investment law regime to benefit from the 
experience that domestic legal systems have in dealing with analogous legal issues,10 restrain 
arbitrators’ discretion in interpreting treaties,11 and enhance the perceived legitimacy of investment 
arbitration.12 Yet, despite enjoying growing support in academia and in practice,13 the use of 
comparative public law to interpret investment treaties has been criticised on both methodological 
and practical grounds.14  
 This article argues that much of the debate regarding the use of comparative public law to 
interpret investment treaties is to a certain extent based on a false premise. One of the central 
strands of argument adduced in favour of such comparative reasoning is that domestic law is 
relevant insofar as it reflects a general principle of law that is applicable by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).15 Practice, however, demonstrates that 
                                                 
5 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’, 
(2006) 17 European J Int L 121, 148.  
6 See Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law – An Introduction’, in Schill (ed.) 
(n 4) 17; Roberts (n 3) 64-65 (distinguishing between the public action and public interest theories of international 
investment law).  
7 Roberts (n 3) 46.  
8 eg Stephan W Schill, ‘The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within’, (2014) 11 Transnational Dispute 
Management. 
9 Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6) 36 
10 ibid. 
11 Montt (n 4) 343-44.  
12 Vadi (n 2) 241.  
13 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion of Thomas 
Wälde (1 December 2005) para 13; Noble Ventures, Inc. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award (12 October 
2005) para 178; Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability 
(14 January 2010) para 506; Total S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability (27 
December 2010) paras 111, 129; Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 
Award (7 June 2012) para 166; Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012) para 403; Gold Reserve Inc. v Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (22 September 2014) para 576.  
14 José E Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?’, (2016) 7 J Intl Dispute Settlement 534; see also José E 
Alvarez, ‘‘Beware: Boundary Crossings’ – A Critical Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to International Investment 
Law’, (2016) 17 J World Investment and Trade 171.  
15 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
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domestic law is commonly used by courts and tribunals as an interpretative aid outside the 
framework of Article 31 VCLT and outside the formal sources of law enumerated in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Investment tribunals that have drawn on 
domestic law have done so not because it embodies a general principle of law, but rather because 
it constitutes a “benchmark” against which investment protection is to be assessed,16 or provides 
the “background” for the interpretation of a provision,17 or because it demonstrates the fairness 
of a regulatory measure.18 Indeed, similar uses of domestic law play a role in the reasoning of other 
international courts and tribunals, particularly in the domains of human rights law and international 
criminal law. The existing literature fails to address squarely the normative and methodological 
issues that are raised by the tribunals’ actual use of comparative law. 
 This article is composed of five sections. Section II traces the development of the public 
law analogy and the debate surrounding the use of comparative public law in the literature, 
highlighting the centrality of the ‘general principles method’. Section III examines the awards of 
international investment tribunals in order to demonstrate that comparative law has been used 
either as a means of substantiating a treaty standard, such as the obligation to accord fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) to investors, or as confirmation for a conclusion made on other 
grounds. Section IV notes the similarities between the uses of comparative law identified in the 
preceding section and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and domestic courts’ use of 
foreign law. Drawing such parallels highlights the complex normative, methodological, and 
evaluative considerations that are raised by investment tribunals’ use of comparative law. Section 
V concludes by suggesting that investment lawyers need to step outside of the framework of the 
VCLT in order to understand and account for the current and future use of comparative law in 
investment treaty interpretation.   
 
II. THE PUBLIC LAW ANALOGY: RATIONALES, FUNCTIONING, AND LEGAL 
BASIS 
 The interpretation of the broad standards and vague provisions that are commonplace in 
international investment agreements (IIAs) is an issue that is of a relatively recent vintage. Whilst 
                                                 
16 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award (7 June 2012) para 193. 
17 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012) para 404. 
18 Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (14 January 
2010) para 506. 
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IIAs were concluded at a moderate pace for the three decades following the first bilateral 
investment treaty in 1959,19 it was not until the mid-1980s that the pace of treaty-making picked 
up significantly, culminating in the creation of a network of over 3,300 IIAs that exist today.20 As 
the number of IIAs increased, so too did the number of investment disputes that could make use 
of the dispute settlement mechanisms contained in those treaties. The first known example of 
international investment arbitration was initiated in 198721 and since then a total of 855 arbitral 
awards have been initiated, with over 50 new arbitrations initiated each year for the past five years.22  
 The increased activity of the investment law regime put into sharp relief the legal issues 
that the nascent regime faced. Systemically, increased recourse to investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) led to questions about the legitimacy of the system, particularly regarding the neutrality and 
accountability of arbitrators.23 However, the increased use of arbitration also raised more specific 
procedural and substantive questions that had until then not arisen. Should, for example, a State 
that prevails in arbitration have to bear its own costs, or should the losing claimant investor be 
ordered to cover the respondent State’s costs?24 What standard should be used to determine 
whether a measure is ‘necessary’ to protect the state’s essential security interests or to maintain 
public order?25 Should amicus curiae briefs be admitted by investment tribunals?26 It was in response 
to these systemic, procedural, and interpretative challenges that commentators and tribunals drew 
analogies with other legal regimes as a way to conceptualise and to develop international 
investment law. One way in which they did so was by drawing an analogy with domestic public 
law.27  
 Roberts identifies two rationales for drawing a parallel between international investment 
law and public law.28 The first, termed the ‘public action theory’, draws on the traditional idea, 
                                                 
19 Zachary Elkins et al., ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000’, (2006) 60 
International Organization 811, 815.  
20 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, xii.  
21 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB 87/3, 27 June 1990.  
22 UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS. 
Accessed 19 June 2018. Note that this dataset includes only information about investment arbitrations that are public.   
23 See for example Van Harten (n 2), 167-75. For a recent elaboration of these criticisms in the context of the European 
Union’s on-going Multilateral Investment Court project, see European Commission Staff Working Document Impact 
Assessment, ‘Multilateral reform of investment dispute resolution’, 13 September 2017, 11-15. 
24 eg ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case no. ARB/03/16, Award (2 October 2006), para 532.  
25 eg Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case no. ARB/01/3 (22 May 
2007) paras 322-45; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case no. ARB/01/8 (12 May 2005) paras 
353-78. Cf. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case no. ARB/03/9 (5 September 2008) paras 189-230.  
26 Aguas del Tunari SA v. The Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case no. ARB/03/02 (21 October 2005) paras 15-18. Cf. Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case no. ARB/03/19, 
Order In Response To A Petition By Five Non-Governmental Organizations For Permission To Make An Amicus 
Curiae Submission (12 February 2007).   
27 Roberts (n 3) 46. 
28 Roberts (n 3) 64-65. Cf Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration Public? (n 14), 535-36 (identifying ten reasons why 
the international investment regime is purportedly ‘public’). 
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elaborated in the context of sovereign immunity, that a state can act in both public and private 
capacities. This creates a “bright-line test” according to which “investment treaty arbitrations are 
public law disputes because the state acted in its public capacity when entering into the treaty, and, 
accordingly, liability for treaty breaches should also be understood as public.”29 The seemingly 
clear distinction between public and private is somewhat muddied when one takes into account 
the existence of ‘umbrella clauses’ in many IIAs, which provide (public) treaty protection to 
(private) contractual obligations.30 
According to a second theory, termed the ‘public interest theory’, the basis of the public 
law analogy rests on the fact that disputes regarding both domestic public law and international 
investment law may involve adjudicating upon acts that “involve significant matters of public 
concern that transcend the private rights and obligations of the disputing parties”.31 Whilst there 
may be disagreement regarding which matters fall within this category, certain investment disputes, 
such as those related to the environment, human rights, or a State’s economy, clearly may have 
ramifications that go beyond the individual dispute.32  
A third theory, which I will call the ‘functionalist approach’, emphasises the functional 
similarity of the two regimes. According to this theory, international investment law is akin to 
public law because it imposes restraints on a State’s exercise of powers vis-à-vis private actors in 
much the same way that domestic public law imposes restraints on the state’s exercise of powers 
over those within its jurisdiction.33 As international investment tribunals apply standards that 
constrain the sovereign actions of a State’s legislature, executive, and judiciary, they function in an 
                                                 
29 Roberts (n 3) 64-65. 
30 Ibid., 65. As Roberts notes, the public v. private distinction is also complicated by the existence of stabilization 
clauses in contracts, which provide for compensation for certain regulatory acts. 
31 Roberts (n 3) 65. See also William W Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Sphere: 
The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations’, (2010) 35 Yale J Int L 283, 288 (“The arbitrations that we 
would classify as falling within the public law sphere are those in which the outcome-determinative issue in the 
arbitration requires a determination of the state’s power and legal authority to undertake regulation in the public 
interest.”) 
32 Roberts (n 3) 65. For what might be considered a paradigm example, see Methanex v. U.S.A., Final Award on 
Jurisdiction and Merits (3 August 2005).  
33 Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6) 17. See also, Van Harten (n 2) 4; Montt (n 4) 12-17; Stephan W Schill, ‘Deference in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualising the Standard of Review’, (2012) 3 J Intl Disp Settlement 577, 587; 
Van Harten and Loughlin (n 5) 148; Thomas Wälde & Abba Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection 
and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law’, (2001) 50 Intl Comp Law Quarterly 811 (“Comparative constitutional 
law seems to provide the most suitable analogy and precedent since treaties in effect set up a similar system of higher-
ranked controls over domestic law-making…”). See also the Submission of the European Union on ‘Possible Reform 
of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS)’ to UNICTRAL Working Group III, 12 December 2017, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145, para. 5 (“These public international law treaties deal with the sovereign capacity of states to 
regulate, by providing certain protections which are enforceable by investors. This creates a situation similar to public 
or constitutional law, in which individuals are protected from acts of the state and can act to enforce those protections. 
It is important to recall that the state is acting in its sovereign capacity, both in approving these treaties and as regards 
the acts challenged.”) 
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analogous manner to domestic courts exercising judicial review over the acts of the executive 
branch of government.34  
 Regardless which theory is adopted (and whether it is adopted wholesale or piecemeal),35 
the analogy with public law provides the basis for responses to a variety of systemic and substantive 
challenges that investment law raises.36 On a general level, it acts as a normative benchmark against 
which one can evaluate the current system of international investment arbitration and as guidance 
for the development of the investment regime.37 For Gus Van Harten, for example, those that 
adjudicate public law matters should be accountable and independent, and their decision-making 
should be both open and coherent. The present system of investor-state arbitration squarely fails, 
in his opinion, to live up to these ideals.38 For others, such as Stephan Schill and Santiago Montt, 
the analogy with public law plays a more direct role, providing arbitrators with a repository of 
solutions to specific issues on which investment treaties are vague, ambiguous, or silent.  
One of the challenges that public law has been called upon to address is the interpretation 
of provisions of a “Delphic economy of language”39 that invite “an almost infinite range of 
arguments”.40 The obligation to accord FET – a standard fixture in almost all investment treaties 
– is the prime example.41 Whilst the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ provide the interpreter with a 
significant degree of flexibility to account for the particularities of the case at hand, they have quite 
correctly been deemed to be “almost devoid of any substantial meaning”.42 Nor do Articles 31 and 
                                                 
34 Van Harten and Loughlin (n 5) 146-48 (describing the international investment system as “akin to domestic judicial 
review in that it keeps public authorities within the bounds of legality and provides enforceable remedies to individuals 
harmed by unlawful state conduct”). 
35 I note that some authors recognise that certain elements of the public law analogy are valid, but do not adopt the 
public law analogy wholesale. Instead, they characterise the investment regime as a public/private hybrid or as a sui 
generis regime; see eg Roberts (n 3) 94; Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration Public?’ (n 14) 576; Julie Maupin, ‘Public 
and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach’, (2014) 54 Virginia JIL 367; 
Paparinskis, ‘Analogies and Other Regimes’; Zachary Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’, (2003) 54 BYIL 151.  
36 See e.g. Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6) 24 (calling the public law analogy the “standard methodology of thinking about 
issues in international investment law, both as regards the interpretation of the often vague standards of investment 
protection and also in addressing concerns about the institutional and procedural structure of investor-state dispute.”) 
See also Stephan W Schill, ‘Editorial: Towards a Normative Framework for Investment Law Reform’, (2014) 15 J 
World Investment & Trade 795. 
37 Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6) 26; Van Harten (n 2) chp 7. This is termed comparison on the ‘macro’ level by Roberts 
and Vadi; Roberts, (n 3) 47; Vadi (n 2) chps 4 and 5.  
38 Van Harten (n 2) chp 7.  
39 Lemire  (n 18) para. 246.  
40 Roland Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (CUP 2011) 3.  
41 See e.g. Denmark-Ethiopia BIT, art. 3(1) (“Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments made 
by investors of the other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment…”); Thailand-Argentina BIT, art. 4(1)(a) 
(“Investments of investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, and also the returns 
therefrom, shall receive treatment which is fair and equitable…”).  
42 Roland Kläger, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Legitimacy and 
Fairness’, (2010) 11 Journal of World Investment and Trade 435, 438. Cf. Martins Paparinskis, The International 
Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (OUP 2013) 112-14.  
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32 of the VCLT provide interpreters with much assistance in interpreting FET.43 Tribunals have 
thus been left with precious little to address the “fundamental and practical question that every 
arbitral tribunal must answer: by what criteria, standard, or test is an arbitral tribunal to determine 
whether the specific treatment accorded to investments of a particular foreign investor in a given 
context is or is not ‘fair and equitable’?”44 
 A range of methods for the operationalization of the public law analogy have been 
suggested. At one end of the spectrum is a “methodologically loose” use of comparative law,45 
akin to the ‘learning’ argument that is commonly invoked by advocates of the use of foreign law 
by domestic courts.46 According to this argument, comparative surveys of public law may open 
arbitrators’ eyes to the range of interpretations of IIAs that are available, allowing them to consider 
how and why certain approaches have been taken in domestic systems and whether such an 
approach is suitable for the international level.47 Such use of comparative law entails no obligation 
to follow the solution adopted by domestic law: “[c]omparative public law thus can be an eye-
opener in raising awareness of possible interpretations of investment treaties without controlling 
that interpretation.”48 
 At the other end of the spectrum is a more ambitious use of comparative law, which I term 
the ‘general principles method’. According to this method, the interpreter is obliged, by virtue of 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT,49 to take into account comparative surveys of domestic public law insofar 
as these elucidate relevant general principles of law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the 
Statute of the ICJ.50 This would allow investment tribunals to concretise both the minimum and 
maximum levels of protection afforded by IIAs, such as developing “standards [to which] 
administrative proceedings have to conform under fair and equitable treatment, or develop[ing] 
                                                 
43 Roberts (n 3) 51; Kläger (n 44) 438 (stating that a literal interpretation would be “doomed to failure from the 
outset”). See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Aguas v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case no ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, para. 202 (stating that the FET obligation is “not 
judicially operational in the sense that they lend themselves to being readily applied to complex, concrete investment 
fact situations.”).  
44 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. (n 45) para 202. 
45 Stephan W Schill, ‘Sources of International Investment Law: Multilateralization, Arbitral Precedent, Comparativism, 
Soft Law’, in Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of Law (2017) 1107-08. 
46 See eg, Justice Breyer in Norman Dorsen, ‘A Conservation between U.S. Supreme Courts Justices’ (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 519, 523; Vicki Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, 
Resistance, Engagement’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Rev 109, 114; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ‘Looking Beyond our Borders: 
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication’ (2003) 40 Idaho LR 1. 
47 Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6) 26, 33; Montt (n 4) 343-44.  
48 Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6), 26. 
49 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT provides: “There shall be taken into account, together with context:…any relevant 
rules of international law application in the relations between the parties.” 
50 Schill, ‘Deference’ (n 34) 594-95; Montt (n 4) 344.  
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methods and thresholds for determining when non-compensable regulation turns into a regulatory 
taking requiring compensation.”51  
For public international lawyers, the clear route of legal reasoning that runs through Article 
38 of the ICJ Statute and Article 31 of the VCLT seems to provide an obvious pathway through 
which comparative law (with its attendant benefits) could be incorporated into investment law 
jurisprudence. The premise underlying this approach is that IIAs are creatures of international law 
and thus their implementation, interpretation, and application is controlled by the sources of law 
and rules of interpretation of public international law. Schill puts this clearly when he states: “given 
that investment treaty tribunals are constituted under international investment treaties, public 
international law has a controlling function for how arbitral tribunals can make use of comparative 
public law. They can only do so to the extent to which the applicable international legal sources 
leave interpretive leeway to arbitral tribunals.”52 
 However, even amongst public international lawyers, the general principles method is 
contentious. In an article published in this Journal,53 José Alvarez forcefully criticised the general 
principles method on both practical and methodological grounds, whilst also more broadly 
criticising the public law analogy itself.54  
From a practical perspective, Alvarez argues that the prospects of finding general 
principles of public law that could be relevant to investment law “would appear to be very scant 
indeed”55 as “national public laws regarding property rights are notoriously context-dependent and 
driven by cultural and other social values.”56 In his view, the heterogeneity of domestic laws was 
the very basis for the creation of autonomous investor rights in international investment law.57 
Accordingly, Alvarez argues that the drafters of IIAs must have intended treaty terms to have a 
meaning that is autonomous from national law, an intention that would be undermined by the 
adoption of the general principles method.   
Methodologically, Alvarez notes that it is unclear how many jurisdictions need to be 
surveyed to induce a general principle, whether one could adopt a convenience sampling method 
(for example, on the basis of ‘legal families’),58 and how one should account for the context in 
                                                 
51 Schill, ‘Introduction’ (n 6) 33. 
52 Schill, ‘Deference’ (n 34) 594-95. 
53 Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration Public?’ (n 14) 534.  
54 Ibid., 535, 542-45. Alvarez himself considers to be more appropriately conceived of as a hybridized form of public 
and private law dispute settlement; Ibid., 540, 576.  
55 Ibid., 565.  
56 Ibid., 565.  
57 Ibid., 566.  
58 For more on the concept of ‘legal families’, see René David, Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, & Marie Goré, Les Grands 
Systèmes de Droit Contemporains (12th ed, Dalloz 2016); Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 
(3rd ed, OUP 1998) ; Neha Jain, ‘Judicial Lawmaking and General Principles of Law in International Criminal Law’, 
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which the domestic law operates.59 This lack of methodological clarity opens the door to courts 
and tribunals to conduct superficial comparative surveys of a select group of countries, presenting 
an opportunity for adjudicators to mask their subjective preferences with “careless 
comparativism”.60 Such an approach would, in his view, constitute a “considerable expansion of 
the third source in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ”61 that may “become a politically charged 
route for a de facto (and unauthorized) return to the Calvo Clause.”62 
 Alvarez’s scepticism regarding the use of general principles in investment law has not gone 
unchallenged. Commenting on a previous paper published by Alvarez,63 Alec Stone Sweet and 
Giacinto della Cananea contend that his analysis constitutes “elaborate wishful thinking”64 that 
“fails to explain actual judicial practice”.65 The authors point to the dissemination of 
proportionality analysis in the courts of the European Union, the European Court of Human 
Rights, and the World Trade Organization, to demonstrate that general principles have moved 
freely between domestic and international jurisdictions without being “bound by originalism or 
the constraints of micro-institutional, comparative analysis” that Alvarez claims should preclude 
their diffusion.66  
Stone Sweet and della Cananea are right to identify the core of Alvarez’s argument 
regarding general principles as normative and prescriptive, rather than descriptive, and are also 
correct to point to the dissemination of certain general principles, such as proportionality, as 
evidence of the breach of such normative precepts. However, their argument aims to respond to 
different elements of Alvarez’s argument than the present article. Specifically, they aim to show 
that the intention of States parties to a treaty and inter-regime differences have not in practice 
precluded the spread of general principles.67 The authors do not answer the different, but related, 
question of how investment tribunals use comparative law.68 As such, whilst Stone Sweet and della 
Cananea’s description of the use of general principles might be valid for the principles that are the 
                                                 
(2016) 57 Harvard Intl L J 111, 134-37; Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Rise and Decline of Legal Families’, (2012) 60 
American J Comp L 1043.  
59 Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration Public?’ (n 14), 568. Jaye Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’, 
(2011) 22 European J Intl L 955-58, 962-66.  
60 Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration Public?’ (n 14) 569.  
61 Ibid., 564.  
62 Ibid., 569.  
63 Alvarez, ‘Beware Boundary Crossing’ (n 14).  
64 Alec Stone Sweet & Giacinto della Cananea, ‘Proportionality, General Principles of Law, and Investor-State 
Arbitration: A Response to José Alvarez’, (2014) 46 NYU J Intl L & Pol 911, 943. 
65 Ibid., 916.  
66 Ibid., 943.  
67 Ibid. 
68 The authors note in passing that tribunals have “largely refrained” from adducing general principles from 
comparative surveys of domestic law; ibid., 951. 
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subject of their study, it does not engage with the methodological and theoretical questions raised 
by the use of comparative law by tribunals.  
 Alvarez’s criticisms – and the debate surrounding the general principles method more 
generally – focus on the wrong questions by relying on idealised normative constructions of 
general principles and presumptions about the use of comparative law. Although the general 
principles method might strike international lawyers as an obvious (if not somewhat convoluted) 
method of incorporating comparative law into investment jurisprudence, an examination of the 
awards in which comparative law has been invoked shows that this is not how tribunals in fact use 
domestic law. Instead, the way in which tribunals use comparative law raises different theoretical 
and methodological questions that have not yet been addressed in the literature.  
III. COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE CASE LAW OF INVESTMENT TRIBUNALS 
 To date, investment tribunals have principally drawn on domestic law in one of two ways. 
First, in the rare instances in which the use of comparative public law has been linked to general 
principles of law, its use has not been justified because it manifests a general principle of law, but 
rather because the treaty provision being interpreted is itself derived from a general principle of law. 
Such reasoning is markedly different from the general principles method described above. Second, 
in a number of cases, comparative public law plays an auxiliary role in the reasoning of the 
Tribunal, acting to confirm or support a conclusion that has been made on other grounds. Each 
of these uses raises different theoretical and methodological issues that will be explored in the 
following section. 
A. Fair and Equitable Treatment as Derived from a General Principle of Law 
 The first strand of case law that draws on comparative public law does so in a way that is 
notably distinct from the general principles method propounded in the literature. These awards 
reason that FET is derived from the general principle of good faith, and that, because of this origin, 
it is justifiable to examine comparative public law in order to substantiate the content of the 
obligation.  
 The first instance of this reasoning was the Decision on Liability in Total v. Argentina,69 in 
which the Claimant argued that Argentina had breached FET by frustrating its legitimate 
expectations. In its Decision, the Tribunal spelled out in more depth why, in its view, comparative 
public law was instructive when interpreting the FET obligation:  
                                                 
69 Total S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability (27 December 2010). 
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“In determining the scope of a right or obligation, Tribunals have often looked as a 
benchmark to international or comparative standards. Indeed, as is often the case for 
general standards applicable in any legal system (such as “due process”), a comparative 
analysis of what is considered generally fair or unfair conduct by domestic public 
authorities in respect of private firms and investors in domestic law may also be relevant 
to identify the legal standards under BITs. Such an approach is justified because, factually, 
the situations and conduct to be evaluated under a BIT occur within the legal system and 
social, economic and business environment of the host State. Moreover, legally, the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is derived from the requirement of good faith which is undoubtedly a general 
principle of law under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”70 
 The Total Tribunal proceeded to accept the argument that the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations was based on the general principle of good faith, and hence “that a comparative 
analysis of the protection of legitimate expectations in domestic jurisdictions is justified”.71 
Acknowledging that “the scope and legal basis of the principle varies” between domestic systems, 
the Tribunal claimed nevertheless that “it has been recognized lately in both civil law and in 
common law jurisdictions within well defined limits”,72 citing Argentinian and English court 
decisions, as well as scholarly writings, as authority. However, when it came to define the scope of 
the doctrine, the Tribunal relied solely on secondary sources as authority for the proposition that:  
“in domestic legal systems the doctrine of legitimate expectations supports ‘the 
entitlement of an individual to legal protection from harm caused by a public authority 
retreating from a previous publicly stated position, whether that be in the form of a formal 
decision or in the form of a representation’.”73 
Two subsequent arbitral awards have referred to the Total Tribunal’s Decision as authority 
for the proposition that comparative public law can assist in the interpretation of FET. In Toto v. 
Lebanon,74 the Tribunal cited the Total Decision as support for the assertion that “[t]he fair and 
equitable treatment standard of international law does not depend on the perception of the 
                                                 
70 Ibid., para 111 (emphasis added, citations omitted).  
71 Ibid., para 128. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid, para. 129. The secondary source from which the quote is drawn from Chester Brown, ‘The Protection of 
Legitimate Expectations as a “General Principle of Law”: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, (2009) 1 Transnational 
Dispute Management, available at <https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1303>. 
Brown himself in turn relies on the comparative surveys carried out by Jürgen Schwarze (Jürgen Schwarze, European 
Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2006)) and Søren Schønberg (Søren Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in 
Administrative Law (OUP 2000)) to reach the conclusion that “there is only a modest amount of common ground.” 
74 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v The Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award (7 June 2012). Note 
that the Tribunal also cited the Lemire v. Ukraine and Noble v. Romania Awards (mentioned below) as authority; ibid., fn 
129.  
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frustrated investor, but should use public international law and comparative domestic public law 
as a benchmark [, a]s was recently also confirmed in Total S.A. v. Argentina”.75 On the facts, 
however, Toto failed to adduce proof that its legitimate expectations had been breached.76  
 The most recent award to refer to comparative public law – and the one that seems to be 
most closely aligned to the general principles method – is Gold Reserve v. Venezuela.77 That case 
related inter alia the alleged breach of FET under Article II(2) of the Canada-Venezuela BIT by 
Venezuela. Echoing the justification given in Total, the Tribunal stated that “the legal sources of 
one of the standards for respect of the fair and equitable treatment principles, i.e. the protection 
of  ‘legitimate expectations’…are to be found in the comparative analysis of many domestic legal 
systems.”78 The Tribunal stated that comparative domestic law was relevant by virtue of Article 54 
of the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, which:  
“directs ICSID tribunals to apply ‘such rules of international law as may be applicable’ 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties. This reference may be considered to include the 
‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ referred to in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice”.79   
 The Tribunal continued to cite German, French, English, Argentinian, and Venezuelan 
law to demonstrate that the concept of legitimate expectations operates to protect the expectations 
of a private person vis-à-vis their legal partner in various legal systems, “in particular when this 
partner is the public administration on which this private person is dependant.”80 
 This strand of case law is open to criticism on several grounds. First, the Toto and Gold 
Reserve Awards expressly refer to the Tribunal’s Decision in Total as authority for their invocation 
of comparative law.81 Yet that Award does not bear close scrutiny. The paragraph of the Total 
Decision on which the Toto and Gold Reserve tribunals rely states that “[t]ribunals have often looked 
as a benchmark [of what constitutes FET] to international or comparative standards”,82 citing two 
awards as authority: the first Partial Award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada and the Award in Genin and 
others v. Estonia. However, when one refers back to those awards, there is neither reference to 
                                                 
75 Ibid., para 166.  
76 Ibid., para 192.  
77 Gold Reserve Inc. v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (22 September 2014). 
78 Ibid., para 576.  
79 Ibid., para 575. This is not, in fact, what Article 54 of the Additional Facility Rules provides. Article 54(1)(a) of the 
Rules provides that, failing the designation of applicable law by the parties, tribunals shall apply “such rules of 
international law as the Tribunal considers applicable.” 
80 Ibid., para 576.  
81 NB the Gold Reserve Award incorrectly cites para 11 of the Total Award. In fact, para 11 describes procedural aspects 
of the case; the correct citation is to para 111.   
82 Total (n 71) para 111.  
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comparative public law nor is there any discussion regarding its use to interpret the relevant treaty 
provisions.83 Indeed, the Genin Award seems, if anything, to be authority for the rather different 
proposition that domestic law and the FET standard are autonomous, stating that “[w]hile the 
exact content of [the FET] standard is not clear, the Tribunal understands it to require an 
‘international minimum standard’ that is separate from domestic law”.84 The subsequent awards are 
seemingly oblivious to the fact that the assertion upon which their use of comparative public law 
is based is nothing but a juristic sleight of hand.  
 Second, despite the Tribunals’ attempts to justify the use of comparative public law to 
interpret treaty standards, their comparative surveys provide little detail as to how analogous 
questions are in fact dealt with under domestic law. Indeed, the Toto Tribunal failed to cite any 
domestic law, whilst the Total and Gold Reserve Tribunals used perfunctory surveys of comparative 
law to demonstrate merely that the doctrine of legitimate expectations is recognised in domestic 
jurisdictions.85 As such, it would be correct to say that the comparative surveys adduced failed to 
shape meaningfully the Tribunals’ approach to FET or legitimate expectations, or to determine 
the outcome of the case.  
 Third, perhaps the most notable feature of these awards is the absence of any reasoning 
which claims that comparative public law manifests a general principle of law that is applicable by 
virtue of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. The Tribunals scarcely enquired into the 
commonalities that exist between domestic jurisdictions (except the general notion that legitimate 
expectations are protected), nor did they draw on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT as the basis for 
invoking comparative law. Instead, the reasoning pursued was essentially the inverse of the general 
principles method: rather than comparative public law constituting a general principle of law and 
thus being relevant to the interpretation of the treaty, the treaty provision’s origins as a general 
principle of law justified recourse to comparative public law.  
 This rationale for drawing on comparative law bears a close resemblance to the approach 
recently adopted by Campbell McLachlan and his co-authors.86 Whilst the Tribunal in Total 
considered FET to be derived from the general principle of good faith,87 McLachlan et al. consider 
the obligation to give “modern expression to a general principle of due process”,88 which they understand 
                                                 
83 The Total Decision later cites the Noble Award as authority for the same; Total, fn 106. As noted below, the decision 
in Noble was not based on an analysis of comparative public law, but on the facts.   
84 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, 
25 June 2001, para 367. 
85 Total (n 71) paras 129-30.  
86 Campbell McLachlan et al., International Investment Law: Substantive Principles (2nd ed, OUP 2017). 
87 Although cf ibid., §7.183, where McLachlan et al. acknowledge that tribunals have linked the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations to the general principle of good faith.  
88 Ibid., §7.15. 
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to be synonymous with the “minimum requirements of the rule of law”.89 Leaving aside the 
question whether FET is based on good faith, due process, or any other general principle, the 
authors are right to point out that “the voluntary acceptance of the principle by treaty transforms 
the question from one of obligation to one of content.”90 In other words, recourse to comparative 
law becomes necessary to flesh out the content of FET, rather than to establish its character as a 
rule of law.91 As such, even if one accepts that FET is derived from a general principle, the 
methodological criticisms that Alvarez raises in relation to the use of comparative public law are 
still relevant.  
   
B. Comparative Public Law as Auxiliary Reasoning 
 The abovementioned awards are exceptional in that they are the only three awards to link 
the use of comparative public law to general principles of law. Other tribunals have drawn on 
comparative law as confirmation of a conclusion reached on other grounds.92 Whilst not 
dispositive of the tribunals’ reasoning, this use of comparative law nevertheless merits close 
analysis. In particular, the awards raise the following question: does it matter, from the point of 
view of methodology or principle, that comparative law plays a merely confirmatory role, as 
opposed to forming the operative part of the reasoning of a tribunal? 
 One of the first arbitral awards to refer to comparative public law was Noble v. Romania,93  
in which the Tribunal was faced with the question of whether judicial insolvency proceedings 
constituted “arbitrary” or “discriminatory” measures that fell foul of Article II(2)(b) of the US-
Romania BIT. As the Treaty gave no definition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures, the 
Tribunal found the definition of arbitrary treatment given by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the ELSI case to be instructive; namely, that an arbitrary action was “something opposed 
to the rule of law…[in the sense that it] is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which 
shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety.”94 In light of the jobs at stake, the factual 
                                                 
89 Ibid., §7.16. 
90 Ibid., §7.19. 
91 Ibid. Cf José E Alvarez, ‘The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment’, (2009) 344 
Recueil des cours 193, 362-63 (stating that the “treatification” of investment protection does not necessarily result in 
increased precision).  
92 One could also place the Award in Occidental v. Ecuador in this category, in which the Tribunal cited comparative 
public law, alongside WTO law and other international investment awards, as authority for the proposition that the 
principle of proportionality is relevant for investment disputes. The Tribunal only noted in passing that “[i]t is very 
well-established law in a number of European countries that there is a principle of proportionality” before analysing 
proportionality in other investment awards in depth. Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012), paras 402-09.      
93 Noble Ventures, Inc. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award (12 October 2005).  
94 Ibid., para 176, citing Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), [1989] ICJ Rep 15, para 128. 
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insolvency of the company, and the likelihood of debt restructuring, the Tribunal concluded that 
“there are sufficient grounds not to regard the proceedings as arbitrary”95 and that “the 
proceedings were at the time the only short term solution for the ‘social crisis’”96 that had engulfed 
the town in which the mill was located.  
It was only after having arrived at this conclusion that the Tribunal referred to comparative 
law. Harking back to the definition of arbitrariness adopted by the ICJ in ELSI, the Tribunal stated 
that “[s]uch proceedings [i.e. the judicial insolvency proceedings at issue] are provided for in all 
legal systems and for much the same reasons. One therefore cannot say that they were ‘opposed 
to the rule of law’ … [the claimant] was in a situation that would have justified the initiation of 
comparable proceedings in most other countries. Arbitrariness is therefore excluded.”97 Like the 
tribunal in Toto, the Noble Tribunal failed to point to any specific domestic law or comparative law 
study as authority for its statement.   
 Comparative public law played a similarly auxiliary role in the reasoning of the Tribunal in 
Plama v. Bulgaria. One argument advanced by the Claimant in that case was that taxes imposed by 
Bulgaria as the result of debt restructuring breached the FET obligation enshrined in Article 10(1) 
of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).98 However, as Plama had not referred the matter to Bulgarian 
tax authorities, as required under Article 21(5) of the ECT, the Tribunal could not “see how this 
claim gives rise to a violation of Bulgaria’s obligations under the ECT.”99 After it dismissed the 
claim on this procedural ground, the Tribunal nevertheless continued to address Plama’s argument 
under the FET obligation, finding that “no action by Respondent…comes anywhere near to being 
unfair or inequitable treatment”, as the Claimant was, or should have been, aware of the tax 
implications of the debt restructuring.100 It was only then, after having rejected Plama’s claim on 
procedural grounds and on the merits, that the Tribunal noted obiter that:  
“Respondent produced evidence which shows that the tax laws of many countries around 
the world treat debt reductions, as were negotiated in this case, as income taxable to the 
beneficiary…[i]t cannot therefore be said that Bulgaria’s law in this respect was unfair, 
                                                 
95 Ibid., para 177. 
96 Ibid., para 177. 
97 Ibid., para 178.  
98 Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95. 
99 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 2008) para 266.  
100 Ibid., paras 267-68.  
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inadequate, inequitable or discriminatory. It was part of the generally applicable law of the 
country like that of many other countries.”101    
 A final example is the Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in Lemire v. Ukraine,102 in 
which the Tribunal was called upon to decide if a Ukrainian regulation that required radio stations 
to play at least 50% Ukrainian music was a prohibited local content requirement under Article II.6 
of the US-Ukraine BIT. The Tribunal accepted Ukraine’s argument that a State has the right to 
regulate its affairs for the public good, especially in matters related to culture or language. It noted 
that other countries, such as France and Portugal, had adopted similar requirements for radio 
stations and thus that such a measure “cannot be said to be unfair, inadequate, inequitable, or 
discriminatory, when it has been adopted by many countries in the world.”103 However, the 
Tribunal went on to state that “this conclusion is really obiter dicta” as the Claimant had challenged 
the measure as a prohibited local content requirement, not as a breach of FET.104 On the facts, the 
Tribunal found that the regulation did not have a protectionist purpose and therefore did not 
breach Article II.6 of the US-Ukraine BIT.  
Several points regarding these awards are worthy of note. First, the tribunals’ use of 
comparative law does not live up to the threshold they themselves set. In both Plama and Lemire, 
the tribunals stated that an action could not be “unfair, inadequate, inequitable or discriminatory” 
if it also existed in “many” other countries. Yet those tribunals cited, respectively, no domestic 
laws and the laws of just two countries. To claim that the measure at issue in those cases is in line 
with a significant body of domestic practice is therefore mere assertion that is unsupported by 
evidence. Furthermore, as a matter of principle, it is not evident why the domestic laws of other 
countries should affect our understanding of what constitutes a discriminatory or arbitrary 
measure. As has been pointed out in the context of the human rights law, deferring to the majority 
view of States in relation to a particular issue risks undermining the very rights that the international 
legal regime was established to protect.105 In the context of investment law, referring to the 
domestic laws of “many countries” fails to protect investors’ rights if those laws are themselves 
arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair, or inequitable.  
                                                 
101 Ibid., para. 269. The Tribunal went on to reject Plama’s claim on another two grounds, noting that Plama had not 
adduced any evidence showing that it had actually paid the tax and that it had not shown that the tax liability precluded 
it from obtaining financing to reopen the plant; ibid., para. 271.  
102 Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (14 January 
2010). 
103 Ibid., para 506. Note that the Lemire Tribunal cited para 269 from the Plama Award as authority for this proposition.  
104 Ibid., para 507.  
105 See eg, E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’, (1999) 31 NYU JILP 843; G. 
Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2007).  
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 Second, as in the preceding section, none of the awards examined drew on domestic law 
because it constituted a general principle of law. Rather, in each case, comparative public law was 
drawn on because it allowed the tribunal to substantiate a standard in the relevant treaty, such as 
what is “arbitrary” (Noble) or “unfair, inadequate, inequitable or discriminatory” (Plama, Lemire). 
The most notable feature of these awards is that the Claimant’s argument was dismissed without 
relying on comparative public law at all, whether on the facts (Noble, Lemire) or because of failure 
to fulfil procedural requirements (Plama). Comparative public law did not signal the death knell to 
the claimant’s argument; rather, it provided support for a decision that had already been made on 
other grounds.  
 
IV. ENGAGING WITH PRACTICE  
 Whilst certain authors claim that tribunals should conduct a survey of domestic law from 
which they can induce general principles, in reality reference to comparative law is less pivotal to 
the reasoning of tribunals - and less methodologically rigorous – than the general principles 
method suggests. Examining the use of comparative law in light of tribunals’ practice puts into 
sharp relief questions of significant theoretical and practical complexity. This section addresses 
just two of the issues that are raised by tribunals’ use of comparative law: first, how might we 
explain why tribunals use comparative law, and, second, what methodological constraints are 
incumbent upon its use? This is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of the issues raised 
by the practice of investment tribunals; rather, it flags areas that have not yet been addressed 
thoroughly by the literature and may be worthy of further investigation.  
A. The Interpretation of Standards 
 The general principles method purports both to explain why tribunals have recourse to 
comparative law and to normatively justify such use. From a descriptive standpoint, the cases 
examined in the preceding section demonstrate that tribunals’ use of comparative law cannot be 
explained by the general principles method. A different – and, in my view, more convincing – 
explanation can be given by focussing on the object of interpretation.  
 In each of the awards examined in the previous section, comparative law was adduced in 
order to interpret a standard.106 In legal theory, standards are distinguished from rules on the basis 
                                                 
106 Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment (OUP 2008) 131.  
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of both their form and their function.107 In relation to form, the distinction drawn is between the 
relative determinacy of certain legal norms (rules) and the relative vagueness of others 
(standards).108 Rules bind “a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of 
delimited triggered facts”.109 The classic example given is that of a speed limit: if the driver travels 
faster than the permitted speed, they have violated the law. Standards, on the other hand, are vague 
legal directives that “collapse decisionmaking back in to the direct application of the background 
principle or policy to a fact situation”.110 Take, for example, a law requiring drivers to travel “no 
faster than is reasonable”.111 Instead of referring to a particular speed, an adjudicator must take 
into account a range of relevant factors (driving conditions, the age and condition of the car, the 
presence of schools in the vicinity, etc.) to determine the level of risk that is reasonable in the case 
at hand. The formal difference between rules and standards is admittedly one of degree: they 
denote two “extremes of a continuous spectrum of ‘ruleness’, with rules representing the 
maximum and standards the minimum”.112 Nevertheless, despite the fact that rules are “not 
infinitely precise and standards not infinitely vague”,113 the distinction is considered to be 
analytically useful.114 
 Rules and standards are also distinguished on the basis of the function that they play in the 
legal system. H.L.A. Hart recognised that the use of standards was one method by which a legal 
system could cater for the inability to anticipate with certainty scenarios that may arise in the 
future.115 In his view, standards are adopted when a legislature cannot determine a priori the 
interests that should be privileged in any given situation. In a similar vein, Neil MacCormick 
describes standards as seeking “to strike a balance that takes account of [an] apparently irreducible 
                                                 
107 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Convergence of Rules and Standards’, (2003) NZLR 303, 305-306 (stating that the 
distinction between rules and standards has “a wide currency in legal theory”). See also Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication’, (1976) 89 Harvard LR 1685, 1685-87; Henry M. Hart & Albert Sacks, The 
Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Foundation Press 1994) 139-41. 
108 Schauer (n 109) 305 (referring to the distinction between “(comparatively) specific rules and (comparatively) vague 
ones as the distinction between rules (specific) and standards (vague).”) 
109 Kathleen M Sullivan, ‘The Supreme Court 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards’, (1992) 106 
Harvard L Rev 22, 58. See also Pierre Schlag, ‘Rules and Standards’, (1985) 22 UCLA L Rev 379, 382-83 (stating that 
rules have “a hard empirical trigger and a hard determinate response” and standards “a soft evaluative trigger and a 
soft modulated response”). 
110 Sullivan (n 111) 58. 
111 Russell B Korobkin, ‘Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited’, (2000) 79 Oregon L Rev 
23. Note that this is not a mere hypothetical example: in the 1990s, Montana had a law requiring drivers to be 
“reasonable and prudent”. The law was later invalidated on the grounds of vagueness; see State v. Stanko, 974 P 2d 
1132 (1998). 
112 Schauer (n 109) 309. See also Korobkin (n 113) 26. 
113 Schauer (n 109) 309. 
114 See eg Korobkin (n 113) 30; Schauer (n 109) 305.  
115 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd ed, OUP 2012) 130-31. The other option identified by Hart to address this was 
to delegate to administrative authorities the task of specifying what was required by the law; ibid., 131. 
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plurality of values”,116 deferring the assessment of the competing values in play to adjudication of 
particular cases.117 To illustrate, one might give the example of the standard of due care in Anglo-
American negligence law, which only takes definite form when considered by an adjudicator in 
light of the circumstances of the case at hand. Rules, on the other hand, are characterised by the 
“fact that certain distinguishable actions, events, or states of affairs are of such practical importance 
to us, as either things to avert or to bring about, that very few concomitant circumstances incline 
us to regard them otherwise.”118 One example is the (relatively determinate) crime of murder, 
which reflects the fact that few countervailing considerations would require balancing against the 
heinousness of killing.119 The determinacy of rules allows individuals to know ex ante the interests 
that the legal system will privilege in a certain scenario.  
In the context of investment law, the form and the function of FET mark it out as a 
standard. The obligation is broad and indeterminate, and its adoption defers the evaluation of the 
myriad different factors that may be relevant to the question of what constitutes “fair and 
equitable” conduct to particular cases.120 It acknowledges that the law simply cannot determine a 
priori which interests should take precedence in relation to certain questions.121 The fact that 
domestic law has predominantly been invoked to interpret a standard, as opposed to rules, raises 
the question whether there is something about the form or the function of those norms that 
justifies – or perhaps necessitates – different interpretative techniques. 
 Standards are commonplace in international treaties that cover a wide range of subject-
matter. A review of the practice of other international courts and tribunals shows that investment 
tribunals are not alone in interpreting treaty standards by reference to domestic law. The 
                                                 
116 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (OUP 2005) 167.  
117 Cf. Olivier Corten, ‘Motif légitime et lien de causalité suffisant: un modèle d’interprétation rationnel du «raisonnable» 
(1998) Annuaire français de droit international 187, 188. Corten argues that the interpretation of ‘reasonable’ by 
international courts and tribunals does not automatically depend on ‘la seule subjectivité de l’interprète, mais qu’il est susceptible 
de faire l’objet d’un contrôle par des tiers, et ce à l’aide de jugements de fait, et non par l’affirmation péremptoire de jugements de valeurs’. 
This is optimistic - Corten, for example, considers that the second stage in reasonableness analysis is the identification 
of a ‘legitimate reason’ for the act under review. Clearly, the qualification of an act as ‘legitimate’ or not is a subjective 
act, even if legitimate reasons are enumerated in the treaty provision. ibid, 189.  
118 Hart (n 119) 133. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Cf Total, para. 107 (stating that “it is difficult, if not impossible ‘to anticipate in the abstract the range of possible 
types of infringements upon the investor’s legal position’”; quoting Christoph Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment 
in Arbitral Practice’, (2005) 6 Journal of World Trade 357, 365). See also Mondev International Ltd. v United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (11 October 2002), para 118 (“a judgment of what is fair and equitable 
cannot be reached in the abstract; it must depend on the facts of the particular case. It is part of the essential business 
of courts and tribunals to make judgments such as these.”); Waste Management Inc. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3 (30 April 2004), para 99 (“Evidently the standard is to some extent a flexible one which must be 
adapted to the circumstances of each case.”) 
121 Cf. Robert Y. Jennings, ‘State Contracts in International Law’, (1961) 37 BYIL 156, 180-81 (“It is perhaps also a 
mistaken notion to set too much store by the method of establishing minimum international standards by comparative 
researches into selected municipal laws.”) 
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methodological and normative considerations raised by the use of comparative law is therefore 
not just limited to the domain of investment law but raises issues of relevance to international law 
more generally. More importantly, however, the use of domestic law by several international courts 
and tribunals to interpret standards suggests that it is the character of those norms themselves that 
leads to reference to domestic law. 
 Take the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has developed a long-
standing practice of drawing on domestic law to interpret standards incorporated in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as an example.122 Commonly referred to as the ‘consensus 
doctrine’,123 the existence of a prevalent approach to a certain issue in the domestic law of member 
states normally leads the Court to interpret the Convention in line with that approach.124 This often 
functions as “the primary determining factor as to whether a right is one protected by the 
Convention”.125  
The vast majority of cases in which the ECtHR refers to domestic law are related to the 
interpretation of a standard. In the ten-year period from 1 January 2005 to 1 January 2015, the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR delivered 183 judgments, of which it used comparative law in 60 
judgments (33% of judgments).126 In 44 of these judgments (73.3%), the Court used comparative 
law to interpret standards, such as what is necessary in a democratic society,127 constitutes a fair 
trial,128 or qualifies as inhuman and degrading treatment.129 Moreover, like the majority of 
investment tribunals, the ECtHR does not justify recourse to comparative surveys of domestic law 
by reference either to general principles of law or Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Instead, the Court’s 
                                                 
122 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222. 
123 ‘Consensus’ is somewhat of a misnomer. Although the actual threshold at which the ECtHR will defer to the 
prevailing approach amongst states is unclear, the Court “frequently, but not consistently, opts against the existence 
of consensus, as long as some 6 to 10 States adhere to solutions which differ from the majority view.”; Luzius 
Wildhaber et al., ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2013) 33 
Human Rights LJ 248, 259. The authors also conclude that in 56% of post-1998 judgments that discuss consensus, 
60-67% or more of member states are surveyed; in 12.3% of cases, around half of the 47 member states are examined; 
and in 7% of cases, less than a quarter of the member states. In 24.6% of cases, the new Court adopts the approach 
of the old Court, and does not explicitly say which countries it has taken into account; ibid, 258.   
124 Wildhaber et al. (n 129) 250.  
125 John L. Murray, ‘Consensus: concordance, or hegemony of the majority?’ in European Court of Human Rights, 
Dialogue between judges (Council of Europe 2008) 27.  
126 The sample of judgments examined in this article is limited to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR as it was 
unfeasible to survey all judgments of the Court in the same period, which total 11,872 judgments.  
127 See eg, Demir and Baykara v Turkey, 12 November 2008, App. No. 34503/97, paras 120-24. 
128 See eg, Taxquet v Belgium, 6 November 2010, App. No. 926/05, para 92. 
129 See eg, Harkins and Edwards v U.K., 12 January 2012, App. nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07, para 133. 
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use of domestic law stems from the idea that the Convention must be interpreted in light of present 
day conditions to effectively protect Convention rights.130 
 In a similar vein, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
has used domestic law to interpret standards in its Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RPE) without justifying such recourse by reference to general principles of law or Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT.131 For example, in its Decision on protective measures for victims and witnesses in the 
Tadic case132 – one of the first decisions issued by the ICTY– the Trial Chamber was required to 
decide the balance to be struck between witness and victim protection and the accused’s right to 
a fair trial under Article 20 of the Tribunal’s Statute.133 In determining how to interpret ‘fair’ in this 
context, the Tribunal found guidance in the approach taken by domestic legal systems in relation 
to anonymity and confidentiality of witnesses and victims, using domestic law as support for the 
proposition that such protection is compatible with the right to a fair trial and as inspiration for 
the standards to be employed should measures of protection be ordered.134 More recently, both 
the Trial and Appeals Chambers in Strugar examined domestic law in order to ascertain the correct 
test for assessing whether the accused was ‘fit’ to stand trial, and was thus able to effectively 
exercise his rights under Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute.135  
 The practice of the ECtHR and ICTY demonstrates that investment tribunals’ use of 
comparative law to interpret treaty standards is not exceptional. But it also suggests that the key 
to explaining why international courts and tribunals refer to comparative law depends at least to a 
certain extent on the character of the norm being interpreted.  
 The idea that standards are interpreted differently is not new. Legal philosophers have 
argued that deductive reasoning seems particularly inapt to describe how lawyers interpret 
standards. Philosopher John Wisdom captured this peculiarly legal form of reasoning in a famous 
essay, stating that: 
                                                 
130 Tyrer v. U.K., 25 April 1978, no. 5856/72, para. 31. See further Başak Çali, ‘Specialized Rules of Treaty 
Interpretation: Human Rights’, in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 537. 
131 Interestingly, in the process of the drafting of the Report of the Secretary-General on the ICTY, Canada suggested 
explicitly that ‘Reference could be made to appropriate national law, if necessary, for interpretive purposes.’ Letter 
Dated 13 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-
General 14 April 1993 S/25594, para 11.  
132 Prosecutor v Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses 
(10 August 1995). 
133 Article 20(1) ICTY Statute (“The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious…with full respect 
for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”) 
134 Tadic, Decision (n 139) paras 31-42, 47-48, 55, 60-67, 71. 
135 Prosecutor v Strugar (Trial Chamber Decision on Defence Motion to Terminate Proceedings) IT-01-42-T (26 May 
2014), paras 29-34; Prosecutor v Strugar (Appeals Chamber Judgement) IT-01-42-A (17 July 2008), paras 52-54.  
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“In such cases we notice that the process of argument is not a chain of demonstrative 
reasoning. It is presenting and representing of those features of the case which severally 
cooperate in favour of the conclusion, in favour of saying what the reasoner wishes, in favour 
of calling the situation by the name by which he wishes to call it. The reasons are like the 
legs of a chair, not the links of a chain…[T]he reasoning is not vertically extensive but 
horizontally extensive – it is the matter of the cumulative effect of several independent 
premises, not of the repeated transformation of one or two. And because the premises are 
severally inconclusive the process of deciding the issue becomes a matter of weighing the 
cumulative effect of another group of severally inconclusive items against the cumulative 
effect of another group of severally inconclusive items…It has its own sort of logic and 
its own sort of end – the solution of the question at issue is a decision, a ruling by the 
judge.”136 
 This description, whilst certainly not valid for all forms of legal reasoning, “captures exactly 
and vividly the way in which we must bring a plurality of factors together into consideration 
when…we seek to pass judgement upon the reasonableness of some decision”.137 When 
interpreting standards, various factors, singularly incapable of supporting a particular conclusion, 
combine in order to provide (arguably) persuasive reasoning that supports the desired result. In 
the absence of clearly-defined rules that lend themselves to syllogistic application, such reasoning 
fulfils the requirement that arbitrators provide a reasoned decision.138  
 The idea that standards are interpreted using ‘horizontally extensive’ reasoning accords 
with the practice of the tribunals examined in the preceding section, each of which adduced 
comparative law as just one element of reasoning – normally alongside the awards and judgments 
of other international courts and tribunals – in support of its conclusion.139 To adopt Wisdom’s 
analogy, comparative law plays the role of a chair leg without which the reasoning might be more 
unstable but would not falter entirely.  
The use of comparative law also responds to what some have called the “tyranny of 
choice”.140 The discretion left to the rule-applier in the case of a standard is not always welcome, 
and not every decision-maker “has the time, energy, or inclination to engage in the ‘from the 
                                                 
136 John Wisdom, ‘Gods’ (1945) 45 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 185, 194. 
137 MacCormick (n 120) 181.  
138 See Article 48(4), Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 160 (“ICSID Convention”). 
139 See eg Total (n 71) paras 109-10 (citing other arbitral awards, the judgment of the ICJ in ELSI and Judge Higgins’ 
Separate Opinion in Oil Platforms in support of its interpretation of fair and equitable treatment); Gold Reserve (n 79) 
paras 569-74 (citing other arbitral awards that recognised the protection of legitimate expectations).   
140 Schauer (n 109) 315-16. 
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ground up’ process that unconstrained discretion and unspecified standards require.”141 As a result, 
they have a tendency to structure their choice to make it more manageable by, for example, creating 
‘guidelines’ or ‘per se rules’ that apply to the standard.142 In the same vein, decision-makers might 
refer to precedents interpreting the particular standard as a way inter alia to structure their reasoning 
and limit their discretion. In adopting these techniques, 
“[f]or the decision-maker concerned about efficiency, docket-clearing (even in a non-
judicial context), allocation of his or her own competence to its highest and best use, and 
apportioning time between more or less important decisions, a way of narrowing the range 
of factors to be considered from what might be available under an open-ended “justice” 
or “reasonableness” standard is highly appealing.”143 
 Comparative law is one mechanism by which arbitrators constrain the otherwise unfettered 
freedom that FET and other standards give them. By referring to comparative law, as well as to 
arbitral decisions, treaties, and case law of other international courts and tribunals, arbitrators are 
able to construct some benchmark of fairness and equitableness to which they can adhere, 
structuring their reasoning and absolving them of the responsibility and burden of substantiating 
the standard from scratch. This seems to be particularly relevant to international investment 
regime, in which the neutrality of arbitrators is frequently called into question.144 By drawing on an 
external source of law upon which to base their reasoning, arbitrators provide a veneer of 
objectivity to what would otherwise be a wholly subjective decision.     
 
 B. Methodological Diversity 
 Whilst the general principles method mandates a comprehensive (or at least representative) 
survey of domestic jurisdictions, the recognition that comparative law plays a confirmatory role in 
the reasoning of tribunals raises the question whether this does – or should – impact the 
methodology of the comparative survey that is carried out. A parallel can be drawn with the use 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 316. 
142 See also Schlag (n 111) 413 (stating that when we consider how standards are applied in practice “it becomes 
apparent that these tests merely defer the constraints on judicial decision making to some external source such as 
precedent…Inflexibility is just as much a part of standards as their supposed flexibility.”). 
143 Schauer (n 109) 316. 
144 See for example, Van Harten (n 2) 167-75; Gus Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetical Adjudication 
(Part Two): An Examination of Hypotheses of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall LJ 
540, 545; Filip De Ly, ‘Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States on a 
Level Playing Field?’, (2005) 6 J World Inv & Trade 59, 60; Olivia Chung, ‘The Lopsided International Investment 
Law Regime and Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration’, (2007) 47 Virginia J Int L 953, 963-66. 
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of foreign law by domestic courts, which has been the subject of renewed interest following a 
string of highly politicised judgments delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 2000s.145  
One characteristic of the debate regarding the use of foreign law by domestic courts is the 
recognition that there is a plurality of ways in which such law can be invoked, each of which entails 
different normative and methodological considerations.146 Consider the argument that foreign laws 
are used as a method of “testing [an] understanding of one’s own traditions and possibilities by 
examining them in reflection of others.”147 Where judges are prohibited from publicly discussing 
pending cases because of concerns regarding neutrality and impartiality, decisions from another 
jurisdiction might act as a “partial intellectual substitute” for discussion regarding the issues in a 
case, providing judges with “a testing from outside that may be particularly helpful on the most 
controversial and apparently value-laden choices.”148 This use of foreign laws does not constitute 
unjustified deference to the will of “like-minded foreigners”,149 but rather prompts deeper 
reflection on whether the “current interpretations live up to our own constitutional 
commitments.”150     
 The diversity of uses of foreign law clearly has methodological implications. Take the 
familiar ‘cherry-picking’ argument as an example.151 The cherry-picking argument rests on the 
assumption that in order to be successful the comparative survey of foreign law conducted must 
be exhaustive (or at least representative) to meet the expected standard of “scientific rationality 
                                                 
145 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005); Lawrence v Texas, 529 US 558 (2003); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48 (2010); Atkins 
v Virginia, 536 US 304, 321 (2002).  See further, Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court 
(Anchor Books 2007) 225-32. Amongst the voluminous literature, see in particular Ganesh Sitaraman, ‘The Use and 
Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2009) 32 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 653; Vicki 
Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement’ (2005) 119 Harvard LR 109; Jeremy 
Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard LR 129; Ernest A Young, ‘Foreign Law and 
the Denominator Problem’ (2005) 119 Harvard LR 148; Norman Dorsen, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials 
in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’ (2005) 3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 519; Steven Calabresi & Stephanie Zimdahl, ‘The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and The Juvenile Death Penalty Decision’ (2005) 47 William 
& Mary LR 743; Michael D Ramsey, ‘International Materials and Domestic Rights’ (2004) 98 AJIL 69; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191. 
146 One of the most interesting works conducted on the use of foreign law by domestic courts is that of Martin Gelter 
and Matthias Siems, who conducted an empirical analysis of 636,172 decisions of domestic courts; Martin Gelter & 
Matthias Siems, ‘Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Citations Between Ten of 
Europe’s Highest Courts’ (2012) 8 Utrecht LR 88, 89. Gelter & Siems’ work surveys the practice of the courts of 
Austria, Belgium, England and Wales, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. They 
find a total of 1430 judgments that cite foreign law.  
147 Jackson (n 152) 114. See also, John Bell, ‘The Argumentative Status of Foreign Legal Arguments’ (2012) 8 Utrecht 
LR 8, 17. 
148 Jackson (n 152) 119.  
149 Roper (n 152) 608 (Scalia J., dissenting).  
150 Jackson (n 152) 127.  
151 See Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?’ (n 14) 567. 
Post-print version. Please cite to final version: (2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
654.  
 
 25 
and objectivity.”152 Yet, there is nothing to say that this standard is valid and applicable to the use 
of foreign law by domestic courts. Rather, it has been rightly recognised as the “mechanical 
projection” of “the aims of (scholarly) scientific research and corresponding precision required 
therein into the judicial use of comparative arguments.”153 The breadth and depth of the 
comparative survey required depends on the exact argument proffered for the use of foreign law.154 
Judges that wish to look to domestic laws simply for inspiration or to use them as a ‘sounding 
board’, for example, “need (in fact quite shallow) inspiration or argumentative support, not deep-
level contextualised scientific ‘truth’.”155 For these judges, there is nothing ‘magic’ about absolute 
comprehensiveness: “we can learn from foreign decisions one by one or in clusters or in something 
approaching a world consensus.”156 That is not to say that the cherry-picking critique has no 
validity, but rather that its purchase depends on the particular justification proffered for the use of 
foreign law. 
 To return to the use of comparative law by investment tribunals, whilst the general 
principles method would require a representative survey of domestic jurisdictions, there is no 
reason in principle why this should be the case for other uses of comparative law. Take the idea 
that domestic law can illuminate the intention of the parties to a treaty, for example.157 Implicitly, 
this was the basis on which the Tribunal in Saar Papier v. Poland drew on the domestic law of the 
States parties to interpret a provision of Germany-Poland BIT that prohibited “measures 
equivalent to expropriation”.158 If one accepts the somewhat dubious premise that Germany and 
Poland intended to give indirect expropriation under Article 4 of the BIT the same meaning as in 
their domestic administrative law, there would be no reason to search further than the case law of 
the two States parties to the treaty.  
 If comparative law is used as an auxiliary or confirmatory argument for a particular 
approach, what implications does this have for the methodology? The reason for citing 
comparative law in support of a particular argument rests on two premises: first, that the public 
law analogy is valid; and, second, that the jurisdictions cited are analogically relevant, in that they 
                                                 
152 Michal Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (OUP 2013) 243.  
153 Ibid., 242. 
154 Waldron (n 152) 175.  
155 Bobek (n 159) 242-43. For an example, see the UK House of Lords’ Judgment in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services, 
[2002] UKHL 22, paras 23-32 (per Lord Bingham); para 168 (per Lord Rodger). See also the U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997) 734-35 (Rehnquist C.J., for the Court). 
156 Waldron (n 152) 175. 
157 The Saar Papier Tribunal is not alone in using domestic law to discern the intentions of parties; see e.g. Panel Report, 
Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services WT/DS204/R (2 April 2004), para 7.110; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 
Preliminary Objections, [1952] ICJ Rep, pp 106-07.  
158 Saar Papier Vertriebs GmbH v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Final Award (16 October 1995) para 79 (“To interpret the Treaty 
administrative law practice in Germany and Poland would be helpful.”).  
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uphold the same values as the international investment regime does or should do. The first of 
these premises does not have implications for which domestic laws are cited, but only for whether 
comparative law is used at all. The second premise, on the other hand, holds the key to the question 
of methodology for the subsidiary use of comparative law. It makes no difference whether the 
tribunal cites the laws of 1, 15, or 100 jurisdictions – what matters is the approval of the values 
embodied by that domestic legal system that is implicit in the citation. The use of comparative law 
as a general matter in that sense is ‘neutral’; the real question is which domestic laws should be used. 
In this context, some authors have criticised arbitrators for adopting Eurocentric approaches, 
privileging domestic legal systems with which they are familiar over those from other parts of the 
world.159  
Intimately linked with this argument is the criticism that arbitrators can obfuscate their 
subjective biases with comparative law.160 Yet it is worth pausing to consider why, specifically, it is 
bad for judges to make such a selection. Judges select all the time. They select precedents,161 
historical sources,162 and separate or dissenting opinions to use as authority. They select to such an 
extent that one judge has commented that the “very process of adjudication implies a selection”.163 
Adjudicators will undoubtedly select the domestic or foreign law that supports their view; in fact, 
the selective use of foreign law by domestic judges has been empirically proven.164 So why, a sceptic 
might ask, should the selection of domestic or foreign laws be singled out as a particularly egregious 
manifestation of subjective bias?  
The fact that arbitrators do not command a Herculean knowledge of comparative law 
necessitates selection, but that fact says nothing in se about the desirability of the approach that the 
arbitral tribunal takes. An arbitral panel that invokes the administrative laws of North Korea and 
                                                 
159 Alvarez, ‘Beware: Boundary Crossings” (n 14) 220-222; Schill, ‘Sources’ (n 47) 1109. See also Ellis (n 61) 955-58. 
160 Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?’ (n 14) 569. Cf. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
‘Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States, September 
12-15, 2005’, Serial No. J-109-37, 201 “Foreign Law. You can find anything you want. If you don’t find it in the 
decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever. As somebody said in 
another context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends ... It 
allows the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, [and] cloak them with the authority of 
precedent.”) See also Richard A Posner, ‘The Supreme Court 2004 Term - Foreword: A Political Court’ (2005) 119 
Harvard LR 32, 86. 
161 Waldron (n 152) 172.  
162 Jeffrey S Sutton, ‘The Role of History in Judging Disputes about the Meaning of the Constitution’ (2009) 41 Texas 
Tech LR 1173, 1185. 
163 Justice Moseneke in Ursula Bentele, ‘Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Experience with 
Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2009) 37 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 219, 239. 
164 Ryan C Black et al, ‘Upending a Global Debate’, (2014) 103 Georgetown LJ 1, 43-44; Brian Flanagan & Sinéad 
Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law’, (2011) 60 Int & Comp L Q 1, 23-24. Cf. Comments of G. 
Kodek of the Austrian Supreme Court in Martin Gelter & Matthias Siems, ‘Citations to Foreign Courts – Illegitimate 
and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe’ (2014) 62 American J of Comp Law 35, 64.  
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Zimbabwe to justify its understanding of FET is unlikely to convince many people of the 
desirability of its approach. But it is not the use of comparative law per se that is objectionable, but 
what that domestic law of those jurisdictions (or the comparative survey more generally) stands 
for. The assessment entails consideration of the fundamental values underpinning the investment 
regime and whether the domestic jurisdictions live up to those ideals. The question is, ultimately, 
one of political values. Further work should explore this question. 
V. ESCAPING THE POSITIVIST PARADIGM 
 The use of comparative law cannot be explained or dismissed as easily as it has been in the 
literature to date. The practice of investment tribunals examined in this article demonstrates that 
comparative law has not been used because it manifests a general principle of law and is thus 
applicable by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT. Instead, comparative law has been used to 
substantiate treaty standards or to confirm an interpretation made on other grounds. In the context 
of international investment law, the use of comparative law relates mainly to the obligation to 
accord FET to investors. 
 The general principles method and the attendant theoretical and methodological problems 
have to a certain extent diverted attention from the host of issues raised by tribunals’ actual use of 
comparative law. From a descriptive standpoint, the general principles method cannot explain why 
tribunals use comparative law. A more convincing explanation focusses on the object of 
interpretation for which comparative law is invoked: standards. Standards, unlike rules, lend 
themselves to a different, non-deductive form of legal reasoning, in which comparative law can 
act alongside other factors to justify a particular interpretative approach. In terms of methodology, 
the general principles method suggests that a comprehensive or representative survey is required, 
much in the same vein as a comparative law academic would approach inducing a general principle 
from domestic jurisdictions. Yet there is nothing to say that such an approach is necessary if 
comparative law is used in other ways. In particular, there is no reason that such a methodology 
would be required if comparative law is adduced to support a conclusion made on other grounds. 
Instead, those that wish to evaluate the use of comparative law in such a scenario must engage 
with the approval that such citation implies.   
 Whilst this article has attempted to add to the debate regarding the use of comparative law 
in international investment law, there are still many matters left to address. Two seem to be of 
particular importance. First, could one argue that the rules of interpretation or the sources of law 
that are applicable to international investment law have evolved to account for the use of 
comparative law? Put another way, how does the practice of tribunals examined here fit within a 
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positive legal framework, if it does at all? Second, what makes referring to a particular jurisdiction 
normatively preferable or justifiable as opposed to another? This is a question of crucial 
importance to the evaluation of comparative law in the future. In order to determine whether such 
use of comparative law is ‘bad’ or ‘good’, we have to make a searching enquiry into the values that 
we want the investment regime to uphold and how those are furthered by referring to domestic 
jurisdictions. In this respect, one cannot help but agree with Neil MacCormick’s observation that 
‘the whole enterprise of explicating and expounding criteria and forms of good legal reasoning has 
to be in the context of the fundamental values that we impute to legal order’.165 That task is both 
daunting, necessary, and unavoidably subjective. 
   
                                                 
165 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (OUP 2005) 1. 
